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This research mainly comprises two empirical
studies. First, in an econometric analysis using
statewide city-level data in Indiana, the first-difference
model developed by Heckman and Hotz is applied to
estimate the effect of property tax abatements (PTAs)
over different sectors. The results indicate that a large
majority of jobs created by the property tax abatement
programs occur in the service sector, not the
manufacturing sector. Despite the significant amount
of attention focused on the manufacturing sector in
discussions surrounding the implementation of
property tax abatement programs, the analysis
demonstrates that there is no significant contribution to
employment in this sector.
A balance between the output effect and the
substitution effect may explain the variation in the
economic effect ofPTAs across different sectors. Even
though the output effect of the PTA programs increases
demand for labor in the community, a decrease in the
cost of capital induces substitution of capital for the
relatively more expensive labor. Overall, the net
impact of PTAs on the employment of each sector
hinges on the balance between the output effect and the
substitution effect.
In addition, by applying the dummy variable
technique, the analysis finds that the economic effect of
PTAs diminishes over time. This finding confirms
with the copycat behavior hypothesis proposed by
previous scholars. Furthermore, the empirical results
suggest that property tax abatements should be used
only in the needy areas to maintain the long-term
success of this program.
Subsequently, in the Indianapolis case study, the
empirical evidence suggests that regulating the use of
property tax abatement programs is effective in keeping
companies and jobs in the underprivileged
communities. While this program has been effective in
general, there are some concerns raised in the analysis.
First, most applicants are current local companies,
some of which repeatedly make use of the same
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existing jobs as a threat in their pursuit for tax breaks.
Furthermore, even though needy center cities have
dominated the use of property tax abatements in the
early years of its adoption, their comparative advantage
obtained through this program seems to diminish over
the long run.
SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION
The first two research questions of this analysis are
concerned with the inter-jurisdictional economic effect
of property tax abatements. While scholars have
estimated the effectiveness of PTAs in general, very
few have considered the potential variation in their
effects over different sectors. Without understanding
how PTAs influence different types of business, the
granting decision of the tax relief can be inefficient.
Therefore, the first research question of this analysis
examines how the effectiveness of property tax
abatement programs varies in attracting economic
activities for different sectors. By applying a firstdifference model on the statewide city-level sample
collected from Indiana, this analysis improves the
methodology used by other researchers and measures
the cross-sector economic effect ofPTAs within a
geographic area not inspected before.
F or a couple of reasons, it is argued that property tax
abatements are typically used to attract investment
from the manufacturing industry. First, the products of
manufacturing firms are usually transported to the
national market. Thus, manufacturers do not rely
heavily on local market and are more willing to move
to pursue the best tax incentive offers. In addition,
because property tax abatements reward capital
investments, they are more lucrative for capitalintensive firms like those in the manufacturing sector.
While the manufacturing sector has attracted the
most attention, this analysis demonstrates that there is
no significant employment contribution to this sector
through the operation of property tax abatement
programs. Instead, it is found that a great majority of
jobs created by the property tax abatement program
come from the service industry. Likewise, this tax
incentive program has also contributed significantly to
the local labor demand of the retail and wholesale trade
sectors.
A balance between the output effect and the
substitution effect may explain the variation in the
economic effect ofPTAs across different sectors. On
one hand, property tax abatements reduce the cost of
capital, increasing the net rate of return on capital in the
PTA-adopting community. A higher rate ofretum on
capital induces capital to move into the PTA-adopting
jurisdiction. As a result, the increased supply of capital
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increases demand for labor and land in the community,
which is the output effect.
On the other hand, property tax abatements reduce
the cost of capital relative to the cost oflabor because
labor is an unsubsidized factor in production. The
change in the relative factor prices induces the change
in capitaVlabor ratio. A decrease in the cost of capital
to firms in the PTA-adopting community induces
substitution of capital for relatively more expensive
labor, and the demand for labor will be reduced at each
level of output. Overall, the net impact ofPTAs on the
employment of each sector hinges on the balance
between the output effect and the substitution effect.
In the output effect, the capital/labor ratio in the
production function determines how many jobs will be
created for a certain amount of property tax levies
forgone. In this regard, offering property tax
abatements to the capital-intensive manufacturing firms
may not be very cost-effective in terms of job creation
due to a high capitaVlabor ratio. In addition, it is also
doubtful how many new jobs will be created when
manufacturing companies upgrade their production
equipment and facilities after the establishment of a
new business. In Indiana, a great number of property
tax abatements are offered to existing companies for
the purchase of manufacturing equipment.
As for the substitution effect, how seriously this
effect will negatively impact labor demand depends on
how easily companies can adjust their production
function to take advantage of this tax relief. In other
words, how practical is it for them to increase the
capital/labor ratio in the production process when the
relative price changes? In this regard, it is the
manufacturing sector that can better adjust this ratio.
Thus, labor in the manufacturing sector is more likely
to be hurt by the substitution effect.
In summary, for the positive output effect, offering
of property tax abatements to the manufacturing sector
is not very cost-effective in terms of job creation due to
its high capitaVlabor ratio. Moreover, for the negative
substitution effect, labor in the manufacturing
companies can be affected more seriously because it is
easier for manufacturers to alter the factors ratio in their
production functions. A combination of these two
reasons may explain why this analysis finds significant
effects ofPTAs on the job growth of the service and
other sectors, but not on that of the manufacturing
sector.
The second research question of this analysis is
concerned with the structural change in the economic
effect of property tax abatements over time. In
contrast, the theme of the third research question is an
investigation of this effect for jurisdictions with
different economic conditions. Seemingly, these two
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research questions are independent to each other. In
reality, they are closely related.
Prior research has found that in the years
immediately following the adoption of the property tax
abatement program by state legislation, cities under
economic and fiscal stress are more likely to provide
PTAs to alleviate their economic problems. Scholars
argued convincingly that if this program works
effectively in disadvantaged areas, it would boost the
welfare for both the PTA-adopting municipalities and
the whole region.
Unfortunately, due to copycat behavior, researchers
found that more and more jurisdictions tend to adopt
similar local economic development policies over time.
As a result, the comparative advantage created for the
poor areas through tax incentives diminishes in the long
run.
Through use of the dummy variable technique, this
analysis finds that there is a diminution in the
effectiveness of the property tax abatement programs
over time. The regression results show that when the
deduction of the local property tax base grew by one
percent in the 1980s, total employment increased by
820. Nonetheless, total employment grew only by 156
jobs in 1992 for the same amount of property tax base
deducted.
In 1982, 26 of the 53 Indiana cities used in this
analysis provided property tax abatements. In 1995,
50 of them were PTA-offering municipalities. As the
number of PTA-adopting jurisdictions keeps growing
and its stimulating effect continues to decrease, it is
plausible that in the near future property tax abatements, instead of being a selective tax incentive, may
become a universal tax reward with no real impact.
The third research question examines whether the
regulation of property tax abatement programs can
effectively boost the economy of center cities. To deal
with the copycat behavior problem, prevent the
effectiveness of tax incentives from declining, help
poor areas, and increase regional welfare, scholars have
proposed regulation of the use oftax incentives in only
the economically distressed areas. While they have
provided convincing theoretical arguments for this
proposition, there is no empirical evidence to support
its validity. Investigation of the third research question
through an Indianapolis case study puts this policy
recommendation into testing.
Though Indianapolis does not limit the provision of
property tax abatements in any specific area, it has
adopted other regulations to aid in the relocation of
low-paying jobs to Center Township and other poor
townships. Companies with an average wage rate
lower than $12.10 per hour must locate in Center
Township to be eligible for property tax abatements.
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In addition, with Metropolitan Development
Commission as the sole designating body, it is assured
that companies cannot manipulate different townships
to pursue better tax incentive package. Through a logit
study, this study also finds that the Commission has
used its discretion to provide more generous property
tax abatements to companies who are willing to locate
in Center Township.
The empirical evidence suggests that the
Indianapolis property tax abatement program was
effective in stimulating the local economy and in
keeping companies and jobs in the underprivileged
communities, especially in Center Township. Billions
of dollars in real and personal property have been
invested, and tens of thousands of jobs have been
affected by the tax abatement recipients in Indianapolis
over the last seven years. A great proportion of these
jobs and capital investments were located in Center
Township.
While this program has been effective in general,
there are some concerns raised in the analysis. By
comparing the number of new and retained jobs
contributed by the Indianapolis program, it is clear that
most applicants were current local companies.
Furthermore, existing jobs have been used and reused
as a tool in the pursuit for tax breaks. City officials
may want to revise this program so that it can be more
successful in attracting new companies and generating
new employment positions.
Though Center Township has dominated in the use
of property tax abatements, especially for real property,
its use of this program has started to decrease since the
early 1990s. Previous research suggested that the
copycat behavior of wealthier jurisdictions could
explain why center cities would lose their relative
dominance in the use of tax incentives over the long
run. This theory, however, cannot account for the
intriguing trend in Center Township because there is
only one designating body for the nine townships in
Indianapolis. With Metropolitan Development
Commission as the sole designating body, it is not
feasible for the copycat behavior to occur in this region.
For the continued success of this program, it is
important for future studies to examine this
phenomenon.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This section proposes a number of policy
recommendations based on the empirical findings.
First, local development officials are advised to be
more specific in shaping their policy objectives. Even
thoughjob creation is the number one concern for local
economic development agencies, most of the
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development policies provide subsidies to capital, not
labor. Scholars have warned about this disparity
between means and goal. This analysis confirms that
property tax abatements as subsidies to capital
investment are not effective in promoting job growth in
the manufacturing sector.
While subsidies to capital might indirectly
contribute to the expansion of local employment, they
may not be the most effective method. If job creation
in the manufacturing sector is the main goal, local
government may do better by subsidizing labor
directly.
Second, due to the substitution effect triggered by
the reduced capital price, even if companies invest in
more capital as a result of the property tax abatement
program, the net effect on local labor demand may not
be positive. Municipalities should devote more effort
to following up on the actual economic contributions of
individual PTA-receiving firms. Ifpromises made in
the statements of benefits are broken, governments
should take action and terminate the tax breaks.
Third, it is recommended that local govemments be
more selective in the provision of property tax
abatements. Studies like this analysis can provide more
information with regard to the economic effect ofPTAs
on different sectors. With this knowledge, government
officials have a better chance of making more informed
decisions. Furthermore, property tax abatement
programs can be used together with other
entrepreneurial demand-side policies. For instance, if
development agencies find that their community has a
comparative advantage over a specific sector, or that
there are some regional or national markets worth
exploiting, generous tax incentives can be provided to
promote the targeted industries. Not only can more
jobs be created, but the mixture of the whole local
economy can be reshaped in a more favorable fashion.
Finally, findings of this analysis support regulation
of the use of property tax abatements. This restriction
can be applied either in state legislation or by city
councils. Without any limitations, all cities can use
them on all sectors, and empirical evidence suggests
that this is precisely what will occur in the long run.
Furthermore, due to this widespread use, the economic
effect of property tax abatements tends to diminish over
time if no restrictions are applied. When all
jurisdictions provide property tax abatements to most
of the firms, it works very much like a statewide
property tax rate cut. In such a case, poor communities
cannot effectively revitalize their economies through
this program. Finally, the findings of this analysis
reveal that the operation of this program is a waste of
administrative costs that results in no significant
impact.
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